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The	UAE’s	presence	in	the	Balkans:	Commercial
interest,	geopolitical	calculations,	or	a	meeting	point
between	‘sultanism’	and	authoritarianism?
In	recent	years,	the	United	Arab	Emirates	has	been	increasingly	active	as	an	investment	partner	in	the
Western	Balkans.	Tena	Prelec	traces	the	involvement	of	the	UAE	in	the	region,	and	examines	how
western	actors	have	responded	to	its	presence.	Given	the	limited	geopolitical	significance	of	the
country’s	involvement,	there	is	little	justification	for	concerns	about	the	UAE	‘taking	up	the	space’	of	the
EU.	But	the	lack	of	transparency	in	recent	investments	should	nevertheless	be	a	key	concern	for	policy-
makers	as	it	has	the	potential	to	undermine	the	conditionality	of	the	rule-based	approach	explicit	in	the
EU	accession	process.
The	planned	Belgrade	Waterfront	development.	Credits:	Attila	Malarik	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)
The	presence	of	so-called	‘foreign	actors’	in	the	Western	Balkans	–	meaning	the	involvement	of	states	other	than
European	Union	members	–	is	a	topic	that	has	been	attracting	growing	interest	of	late.	Media	are	keenly	covering	the
Russian,	Chinese	and	Turkish	presence	in	the	region,	and	no	policy	consultation	goes	by	without	this	issue	being
prominently	tackled.	This	interest	raises	two	sets	of	questions.	One	is	substantial:	what	are	these	countries	really	up
to?	Is	their	interest	commercial	or	geopolitical?	Are	there	any	security	implications?	And	the	second	one	is	reflexive:
why	are	we	so	spasmodically	interested	in	this	matter?
A	study	I	have	carried	out	with	colleagues	at	the	LSE	and	Zayed	University	has	attempted	to	answer	the	substantial
questions	in	terms	of	the	United	Arab	Emirates’	(UAE)	increasing	investments	in	the	Balkans.	Financial	involvement
of	the	UAE	in	South	East	Europe	is	not	a	new	phenomenon,	but	while	previous	disbursements	to	Kosovo	and	Bosnia
in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s	were	mainly	intended	as	post-war	foreign	aid,	the	interest	that	has	developed	over	the
last	decade	–	especially	in	Montenegro,	in	Serbia	and	more	recently	in	Bosnia	–	is	indisputably	related	to	business
investments.
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The	first	UAE	embassy	in	the	Balkans	was	opened	in	2012	in	Montenegro,	two	years	into	the	construction	of	the
Atlas	Capital	Centre	in	Podgorica	by	the	Abu	Dhabi	Financial	Group.	Underlining	the	close	relation	between	the
business	investments	and	political	ties,	the	diplomatic	outpost	is	located	within	the	luxury	shopping	mall	itself.	The
main	sectors	of	investment	in	Montenegro	are	tourism	and	agriculture.	UAE	officials	stressed	that	they	hoped	for
Montenegro	to	be	their	“gateway	to	the	Balkans”:	a	region	they	are	interested	in	setting	their	foot	on	via	niche
industries	before	it	joins	the	much	larger	EU	market.	The	geopolitical	implications	are	not	hidden	(it’s	good	to	make
“friends	around	the	globe”),	but	what	they	highlight,	most	of	all,	is	a	specific	investment	logic:	the	UAE’s	end-game	is
markedly	long-term,	preparing	the	country	for	a	post-oil	economy	a	few	decades	down	the	line.
The	involvement	in	Serbia	came	slightly	later,	but	it	ended	up	being	even	more	sizeable.	In	2013,	Deputy	Prime
Minister	Aleksandar	Vučić	(later	to	become	Prime	Minister	and	then	President)	announced	several	high-profile
business	deals	and	a	$1bn	state	loan,	which	were	followed	by	investments	in	four	main	industries:	agriculture,
construction,	air	transport,	and	armaments	production.	The	overhaul	of	Serbia-UAE	relations	has	indeed	been	quite
stunning:	from	being	vocal	critics	of	Serbia’s	actions	during	the	wars	of	the	1990s,	Emirati	leaders	are	today	viewed
as	having	excellent	relations	with	their	Serbian	counterparts.	A	largely	ideological,	value-based	approach	has	been
left	behind,	making	space	for	more	pragmatic	relations.
In	neither	country	have	UAE	investments	passed	without	controversy.	What	characterises	these	deals	is	a	marked
lack	of	transparency,	frequently	accompanied	by	a	lex	specialis	granting	great	concessions	to	the	investor,	and	a
decision-making	process	that	occurs	almost	exclusively	from	the	top	echelons	of	both	sides.	The	potential	avenues
for	corruption,	as	well	as	the	allegation	that	both	Milo	Đukanovic	and	Aleksandar	Vučić	are	linked	to	Abu	Dhabi’s
ruling	family	through	Palestinian	politician	Mohammad	Dahlan	(who	holds	both	a	Montenegrin	and	Serbian	passport),
have	been	dismissed	as	nonsense	by	all	sides.	However,	episodes	such	as	the	2016	overnight	demolition	of	houses
by	never	identified	masked	individuals,	in	the	same	area	where	the	partially	UAE-funded	development	‘Belgrade
Waterfront’	is	to	rise,	have	done	little	to	help	establish	those	enterprises	as	serious	investments	underpinned	by	a
dedication	to	the	rule	of	law.
This	scarce	commitment	to	transparent	and	accountable	investing	is	worrying.	In	a	forthcoming	book	chapter,	Will
Bartlett	and	I	argue	that	the	political	cultures	of	the	leaders	in	the	Balkans	and	in	the	UAE	are	in	many	ways
compatible.	This	is	good	news	for	the	continued	economic	engagement	of	the	two	sides,	but	potentially	bad	news	for
the	democratic	development	of	the	Western	Balkans	countries.	The	UAE’s	“sultanism”	–	a	personalised	power
blurring	the	line	between	the	public	and	the	private,	in	which	state	resources	are	viewed	as	personal	property	of	the
ruler	and	his	associates	–	has	encountered	fertile	ground	in	a	region	largely	characterised	by	a	backsliding	towards
(or	a	stagnation	of)	authoritarianism.
Which	brings	us	back	to	the	second,	reflexive,	set	of	questions:	why	are	western	debates	so	focused	on	what	‘others’
are	doing	in	the	Balkans?	Should	they	be?	As	shown,	at	least	in	the	case	of	the	UAE,	the	geopolitical	motives	are
either	feeble	or	non-existent.	The	threat	of	another	actor	‘taking	up	the	space’	of	the	EU	/	the	West	is	not	justified	in
this	instance.	However,	the	alarm	bells	point	at	a	modus	operandi	which	is	clearly	top-down,	largely	non-transparent,
and	therefore	capable	of	entrenching	existing	political	and	business	elites	through	clientelistic	routes.	In	this	sense,
non-transparent	investments	should	indeed	be	a	key	concern	for	policy-makers,	as	they	have	the	potential	to
undermine	the	conditionality	of	the	rule-based	approach	explicit	in	the	EU	accession	process.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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